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1 Introduction
For decades Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory at the aggregate level and
Law of One Price (LOP) at the product specic level have been key building
blocks of international monetary models. According to the theory the symmet-
ric price adjustment mechanism ensures that the real exchange rates are time
invariant with respect to nominal exchange rate shocks. Despite its intuitive
appeal, empirical ndings as regards PPP (and LOP) have been inconclusive.
Two controversial ndings that we would like to address in this paper are as
follows: Firstly, there is vast evidence that nominal exchange rate shocks often
tend to lead to very persistent if not permanent PPP deviations.1 Real exchange
rates are very volatile and real exchange rate deviations are very persistent (see
e.g. Chari et al. (2000)). Even long time series or panel data applications do
not provide su¢ ciently convincing support in favor of PPP. Although current
research interprets PPP as a long run attractor evidence in favor is still rather
poor. Secondly, nonlinear tests such as of Enders and Dibooglu (2001) taking
the French Franc and German DM as reference currencies provide some evidence
that there is some asymmetry in the price adjustment process after exchange
rate shocks.2
In response to empirical ndings of PPP (and LOP) violations pricing to
market literature pioneered by Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987) received
substantial attention. The pricing to market literature provides various theo-
retical explanations for incomplete short run symmetric price adjustment with
respect to depreciations and appreciations. To name a few, product di¤erentia-
tion, currency denomination of exports and imports, size of the market, vertical
trade all seem to contribute to short run deviations from the PPP.3 Dornbusch
(1987) for example uses Salops circular model of spatial competition, among
others, to analyze the adjustment of prices to exchange rate changes. This exer-
cise yields some insights into the level of pass-through in di¤erentiated product
markets. Yet Dornbuschs discussion does not cover changes in market struc-
ture. His analysis essentially focuses on the short-run. In a theoretical long run
analysis, Baldwin (1988) was the rst to point out that foreign rms, having
invested heavily in marketing, R&D and the like to enter a domestic market,
may nd it protable not to quit the domestic market even at very low exchange
rates. By staying in the market, these rms anticipate to recover at least part
1For this very controversial issue see for example Froot and Rogo¤s (1995) literature
review. For panel data evidence see Papell (1997) or OConnell (1998). See also Imbs et al.
(2005) where it is shown that sector level price di¤erentials can be very persistent and very
heterogeneous across sectors.
2See also Burstein et al. (2005) for a comparison of price responses in both appreciating
and depreciating currencies for the US Dollar vis-à-vis Swedish, Finnish, Brazilian, Mexi-
can, Malaysian, Indonesian, Philippine, Korean and Thai currencies after large exchange rate
change episodes in the 90s.
3See among others Dornbusch (1987), Friberg (1998), Aksoy and Riyanto (2000) and Bac-
chetta and van Wincoop (2005). The new international macroeconomics literature incorporate
some of these microfoundations for price stickiness.For explicit incorporation of pricing to mar-
ket behaviour of rms into macroeconomic models see for instance Betts and Devereux (1996,
2000), or Chari et al.(2002). For a useful survey of this literature see Lane (2001).
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of their sunk investment. Exchange rate shocks can change the structure of the
market and the resulting changes in prices and trade volumes may persist even
after the exchange rate returns to its previous value.4
In this paper we develop a model that substantially extends the Dornbusch-
Salop framework to address the failure of the LOP and its international trade
implications. We suggest a new dynamic integrated partial equilibrium approach
that features product di¤erentiation and endogenizes market structure at the
same time.5 There are two distinct features of our model.
First our model can account for an asymmetry in the rms price adjustment
process with respect to large exchange rate shocks. We are not the rst to
suggest an asymmetric adjustment in prices vis-à-vis exogenous shocks. For
instance, Devereux and Siu (2005) show that due to strategic linkages rms
have greater incentive to raise their prices with respect to positive marginal costs
shocks than to reduce their prices with respect to negative marginal shocks (in
absolute terms). The reason for the result is that rms treat prices as strategic
complements in the face of positive marginal shocks and strategic substitutes
in the face of negative shocks. Burstein (2006), on the other hand, studies a
dynamic pricing problem with xed costs where a pricing plan change is costly
due to informational constraints and therefore nominal rigidities arise. He shows
that monetary expansions lead price adjustments than monetary contractions.
A seller whose price is too low stands to make less prot per item sold, and
also to sell additional units of output. Both of these e¤ects create incentives
for the rm to raise prices. In contrast, a seller whose price is too high stands
to sell fewer units, but make a higher prot on each unit sold. The net e¤ect
is that rms are more reluctant to decrease their prices than to increase them.
(see also King and Wolman (1999) for a similar reasoning).6 In this paper we
propose very di¤erent pricing dynamics.
Secondly, the integrated approach allows us to discuss an array of conditions
where short and long run monetary neutrality within the international context
is violated. In other words, the model presents in detail under which conditions
imperfect competition is able to generate persistent and volatile real exchange
rate deviations. We also show that most of the predictions survive alternative
market congurations.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, small currency
shocks which fall within a given range are unlikely to a¤ect the structure of the
domestic market. If currency shocks are small rms price to market as a function
of the existing market structure. Within this range, rms price to market in a
4This argument was further rened and extended by Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and
Dixit (1989). For empirical evidence of the relevance of sunk costs see Roberts and Tybout
(1997).
5See also a recent paper by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) that focuses on xed costs, hetero-
geneous productivity, and endogenous entry into both domestic and export markets in the
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
6Hansen and Prescott (2002) based on occasionally binding capacity constraints, Danziger
(2002) and Danziger and Kreiner (2003) based on models with high xed cost of quantity
adjustment do similar claims. We are grateful to a referee for raising our attention to this
literature.
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symmetrically with respect to the sign of the currency shock. However, large
and persistent depreciations may induce foreign rms to leave the market, which
underlies the hysteresis result in the literature. Similarly, sizeable appreciations
can set o¤ foreign entry into the home market.
Secondly, the model predicts asymmetry in the range of no-market-structure-
change. The bounds of this range depend on the persistence of shocks, the cost
structure and the degree of product heterogeneity. As the persistence of the
shock decreases, the foreign brand is willing to accept higher current losses and
the devaluation threshold beyond which foreign brands quit the domestic market
rises. Conversely, smaller appreciations su¢ ce to trigger entry as the persistence
increases. Furthermore, the devaluation threshold rises as the industry ratio of
sunk- to xed costs rises. Moreover, higher levels of product di¤erentiation favor
those rms that are at a competitive disadvantage. This implies that the lower
bound of the range drops as di¤erentiation increases. Entry at low exchange
rates is simply less protable for the entering foreign brand. Similarly, the
upper bound rises since higher brand di¤erentiation reduces the size of foreign
brand losses at high exchange rates. Comparing the results across industries,
this model predicts that larger appreciations are needed to trigger entry in
industries characterized by high levels of heterogeneity and large xed costs.
Thirdly, these structural market changes in turn a¤ect pricing strategies. As
the total number of players in the domestic market changes, the demand curves
facing the rms shift and the extent of product di¤erentiation is altered. This
causes a xed-size and across-the-board drop, in the case of an appreciation, or
increase, in the case of a depreciation, of all brand prices. In addition, the do-
mestic brands gain or lose market power as their relative market share changes.
As a result, the responsiveness of prices to currency shocks is altered. All of
this turns out to imply that pass-through is smaller for large depreciations and
larger for large appreciations. Interestingly, this asymmetry implies larger, and
possibly more persistent, positive than negative PPP deviations of the real ex-
change rate. However, note that, as the rm entry requires, in absolute terms,
larger appreciations than rm exit requirement of large depreciation, prices may
increase more easily after depreciations than they decrease after appreciations.
Fourthly, a given currency shock has a larger impact on foreign brands facing
direct competition from the domestic brand. This is where the spatial compe-
tition setup really starts to matter. The extent of product di¤erentiation is the
key to understanding the observed di¤erences in price and quantity responses
on the part of foreign rms. The foreign rms closest to the domestic brands
are most likely to quit the market after a devaluation. These foreign brands, be-
ing relatively similar to their domestic counterparts, simply experience a larger
decline in prot margins in response to a devaluation.
Finally, this model clearly shows that strategic pricing behavior as such is not
su¢ cient to generate incomplete pass-through. The model predicts invariance
of the real exchange rate with regard to small nominal currency shocks if
the market structure at home and abroad are fully symmetrical, that is if the
domestic and foreign rms have identical market shares at home and abroad.
Pass-through is incomplete if and only if the domestic brands have a smaller
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market share abroad. Remarkably, if some of the domestic rms operating
abroad do not serve the domestic market, the model predicts that the real
exchange rate moves counter to the nominal exchange rate.
As noted above our model is partial equilibrium in nature. We treat ex-
change rates as exogenous variables. Furthermore, capital markets are absent.
These are all, of course, important simplifying assumptions rendering our model
somewhat restrictive. While our model is directly relevant to LOP and sector
specic pricing and trade matters, the PPP discussion requires a general equilib-
rium approach with stochastic dynamics. We leave dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium implications of our model for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and main
underlying assumptions. Section 3 focuses on a stylized 4-incumbent version of
the model. Here we show the di¤erential impact of large and small exchange
rate changes on market structure. Section 4 provides some extensions on the
stylized model. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Outline of the Model
In his seminal paper Dornbusch (1987) applies the Salop (1979) model to ana-
lyze the adjustment of prices in response to exchange rate shocks in heteroge-
neous product markets. Dornbusch assumes that domestic and foreign brands
are located equidistantly and alternatingly on a circle upon entry. Domestic
and foreign brands di¤er in that the latter incur the costs of production in for-
eign currency. The analysis of the nature of price competition in this model
yields novel insights into the pricing-to-market phenomenon. However, as such
the model cannot deal with the e¤ects of real exchange rate shocks on market
structure since entry and exit destroy the symmetry of the model.
To allow for the possibility of market structure changes, Dornbuschs (1987)
symmetrical setup is replaced by a clustered structure in which the markets
covered by foreign and domestic brands touch at only two locations on the
circle. In addition to its intuitive appeal, this asymmetrical setup proves quite
tractable in dealing with entry and exit. It has to be noted, however, that this
version of the model cannot be solved in general. This is why one needs to
specify the number of foreign and domestic brands competing in the domestic
market. Naturally, this entails some loss of generality. Below we illustrate that
the main results are robust to changes in the number of rms.
In addition, the number of potential entrants is restricted. We concentrate
our attention on entry and exit decisions in international trade. In other words,
we do not consider the possibility of foreign direct investment in the presence
of exchange rate shocks. Obviously, some foreign trade companies may get in-
volved in domestic production activities rather than to take the stay, entry or
exit decisions in their trading activities in the presence of exchange rate changes.
For reasons of tractability we will exclude this relevant option. Generally speak-
ing, changes in the exchange rate do not drive the creation of new rms in most
heterogeneous goods industries (for instance, the automobile industry). Instead,
5
exchange rate shocks mostly cause existing brands to enter or exit specic mar-
kets. It seems natural to assume that the number of potential entrants is xed
and bounded7 . Furthermore, the market structure changes in response to ex-
change rate shocks in any given industry are triggered mainly by foreign brands.
Accordingly, to focus the analysis on the relevant issues, assume there are no
potential domestic entrants. Similarly, exit on the part of domestic incumbents
is largely ruled out by the relative cost e¢ ciency of domestic brands. This is
discussed in detail below.
When considering the possibility of entry or exit in any given market, agents
exchange rate expectations naturally play a key role. In this model, agents are
taken to have perfect foresight. Ideally, the exchange rate and the expectations
thereof would be endogenously determined within the model. For reasons of
tractability, our model adopts a partial equilibrium approach in the sense that
the nominal exchange rate process is fully exogenous. This is a highly restric-
tive assumption, nevertheless, it serves as a natural benchmark case. It is of
course possible to extend the model to capture stochastic dynamics by adding
unexpected shocks with the use of, for instance, the [s,S] pricing rules found
in state contingent pricing models. (Caplin and Leahy (1991)). Exchange rate
uncertainty may qualitatively alter our results. For reasons of brevity, we leave
this to future research.
Having outlined the main assumptions underlying the analysis, this section
concludes by introducing the model itself.
2.1 Producers
Domestic and foreign rms incur xed costs (FDand FF ) when active in the
domestic market. These include all recurrent expenses that are locked in for
exactly one period such as brand name maintenance advertising and distribution
costs (Baldwin, 1988). Firms have to incur these costs at the start of every
period in order to stay in the market. Note that in our model, F does not
include the actual costs of production. In fact, all rms have access to the same
constant returns to scale production technology: wD = wF ; where w denotes
the marginal cost of production. Foreign brands are at a xed cost disadvantage
relative to the domestic brand8 : FF > FD. This assumption will prove to be
useful as we analyze the entry and exit decisions of the foreign rms in the
domestic market.9 In addition, entrants incur a sunk cost S before entering the
domestic market. This includes all costs incurred while setting up a distribution
network, establishing a brand name, etc. Once an incumbent has left the market,
7This boundedness assumption reects the scarcity of certain irreplacable inputs. It is hard
to think of industries producing highly di¤erentiated goods that have an unlimited supply of
potential entrants.
8Foreign brands may incur higher xed costs for a variety of reasons such as higher trans-
portation, distribution and brand maintenance advertising expenditures.
9 In spite of its intuitive nature this assumption may not always be true. Under certain
circumstances some foreign rms may even have xed maintenance cost advantage as compared
to their domestic counter parts (as it may well be in the Central and Eastern European case,
where Western companies may have access to better maintenance cost technologies).
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or, equivalently, not served the market for one period, re-entry requires spending
of the entire sunk cost S again. Both the xed (F ) and sunk (S) costs are
incurred in the domestic market, therefore in domestic currency, since these are
not related to the actual production of the commodities. Production costs (w)
are incurred in the country of origin, i.e. in foreign currency.
We exogenously impose the location of the rms in the product space. We
assume that producers are located equidistantly on the circle upon entry. Rather
than allowing the entrant to choose its location freely, we chose to maintain the
equal spacing assumption. This assumption may impose some limitations on
the analysis. Firstly, maximum di¤erentiation obtains with quadratic trans-
portation costs in the linear city. As shown in DAspremont et al. (1979) with
the linear city example with two rms, the equilibrium has the two rms locat-
ing at the two extremes of the city.10 For the circular city, Economides (1984)
shows that the free entry symmetric equilibrium also obtains in locations and
prices in the case of quadratic transportation costs. However, this result may
not be general for di¤erent cost structures. Secondly, we assume simultaneity
in the entry decisions of the rms to eliminate strategic aspects of product po-
sitioning (see Tirole (1994)). The analysis becomes more complicated if rms
enter sequentially. Given that rms enter sequentially, the equilibrium pattern
of location will be a function of the rmsanticipation of future locations in the
product space. Furthermore, optimal timing of entry would be another matter
of concern. To avoid further complication we choose for simultaneity in the
entry decisions of the rms. Endogenizing the locational choice and allowing for
sequential entry in this type of model, while technically demanding, may provide
further insights into the e¤ects of exchange rate shocks on market structure.
Naturally, some assumptions need to be made concerning the relative posi-
tion of new entrants. In our model, a bidding game precedes the actual entry
stage. Potential entrants engage in a bidding game with each of the foreign
incumbents for the corresponding brand location. In equilibrium, the foreign
incumbent bids an amount corresponding to the excess expected prots of this
location relative to the location furthest from the domestic incumbent. This
makes the entrant exactly indi¤erent between the latter location and the other
locations on the circle. The entrants optimal bid is zero and as a result she
simply ends up in the location furthest away from the location of the domestic
brand. Note that this situation constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium since
the incumbents, not having to incur the sunk entry cost, can always outbid the
entrants. As it turns out, foreign incumbents invariably maintain their brands
relative position in terms of proximity to the domestic brand and the entrant
is forced to market the brand furthest from the domestic one. Note that this
brand is the least protable at real exchange rates below PPP. In what follows,
the bidding game itself will not be explicitly analyzed any further. We assume
that the new entrant ends up in the least protable position and its implications
will be eloborated throughout the paper.11
10 In other words, each rm tries to soften the price competition via locating (di¤erentiating)
as far as possible from each other (maximal di¤erentiation).
11An alternative assumption could be that the incumbent rms have access the most desir-
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2.2 Consumers
L domestic consumers are distributed uniformly on the circle. These consumers
buy the brand closest to their preferred brand l which coincides with their posi-
tion on the circle. Let c denote the utility cost per unit of distance. Consumers
purchase one of the goods o¤ered in the domestic market provided that:
max
i
[u  c jli   lj   pi]  es (1)
where li denotes the position of brand i, jli   lj refers to the shortest distance
between li and l and es denotes the surplus derived from consuming the homoge-
neous outside good. Regardless of the exchange rate we only consider equilibria
in what Salop (1979, p. 143) refers to as the competitive region. The competi-
tive region is composed of prices in which consumers are attracted who would
otherwise purchase some other di¤erentiated brand(Salop, 1979, p.143). Sim-
ply put, the brands cover the entire market and engage in direct competition
with each other. None of the consumers prefer the outside good12 .
3 Four- incumbent Model
To start the analysis, we analyze a particular version of the model that features
4 incumbents, three of which are foreign. Two of the foreign incumbents are
situated adjacent to the domestic brand. These rms compete directly with
the domestic brand and the non-adjacent foreign brand. Note that this simple
4-brand example features 3 di¤erent prices: the domestic brands price, the
non-adjacent- and the two adjacent foreign brands prices. In addition, the
maximum number of domestic entrants is xed at 1, while the maximum number
of potential foreign entrants is 4. This setup reects all of the assumptions
introduced in the previous section. The properties of this model will be explored
under three di¤erent exchange rate scenarios.
This is a two-stage game. Initially the market is served by 4 incumbents.
Before the start of the game the entire path of future exchange rates is observed
by all players, including all potential entrants. In the rst stage non-incumbent
brands may decide to enter or incumbent brands may decide to leave the mar-
ket. In the second stage these brands compete in prices. The two-stage game
is solved by means of backward induction. Having solved for Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium pricing strategies in the second stage, the equilibrium number of
brands is derived from the reduced form prot functions.
able positions in the market place, leaving any newcomer closest to the domestic competition.
This assumption would a¤ect the identication of the rms to exit after large depreciations,
however, would not change our qualitative results as regards the asymmetry of the band-of-
inaction in Section 3.2.1. Our results critically dependent on the existence of sunk costs and
the degree of competition, not only on the relative position of the competitors in the product
space.
12 In other words, we assume es is relatively small.
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In the second stage rms maximize current prots in deriving their optimal
pricing strategies.13 Let Et denote expectations conditional on information at
time t. R is the discount rate. First, consider the domestic rms objective
function :
Et
" 1X
s=0
Rs

p
D
t+s   w
D
L
c
(p
FA
t+s +
c
4
  pDt+s)

  FD
#
; (2)
where p
FA
t+s denotes the adjacent foreign brand. The domestic brands demand
curve was derived by locating the indi¤erent consumer L on both sides. Simi-
larly, we derive the prot function of the adjacent foreign rm (denoted FA).
Let et+s denote the exchange rate (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency). Note that these rms compete with two rms possibly charging dif-
ferent prices. Market shares are not necessarily equal on both sides. The adjacent
foreign rms objective function in terms of domestic currency is:
Et
24 1X
s=0
Rs

pFAt+s   et+sw
F
24 L2c pDt+s + c4   pFAt+s+
L
2c

p
FNA
t+s +
c
4   p
FA
t+s
 35  FF
35 : (3)
Finally, we turn to the non-adjacent foreign rm (denoted FNA) facing identical
prices on both sides:
Et
" 1X
s=0
Rs

p
FNA
t+s   et+sw
F
L
c

p
FA
t+s +
c
4
  pFNAt+s

  FF
#
: (4)
Solving for the 3 optimal pricing strategies in period t+ s on the part of the
incumbents yields:
p
D
t+s =
c
4
+
1
12

7w
D
+ 5et+sw
F

; (5)
p
FA
t+s =
c
4
+
1
12

2w
D
+ 10et+sw
F

; (6)
p
FNA
t+s =
c
4
+
1
12

w
D
+ 11et+sw
F

: (7)
The derivation of optimal pricing strategies in other market congurations
is identical and will not be given. Several stylized exchange rate scenarios will
be considered.
3.1 PPP Symmetric Equilibrium
First, consider the benchmark case in which the exchange rate is expected to
remain indenitely at its PPP value: Etet+i = et+i = 1; i = 1; 2; 3    : Foreign
and domestic rms produce at the same e¤ective marginal cost in all future
13We assume that second order conditions are strictly negative so that prot maximization
conditions are satised.
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periods. In this particular case the standard fully symmetric equilibrium obtains
in every future period. Domestic and foreign rms charge identical prices:
p =
c
n
+ w; (8)
where n denotes the number of incumbents. Turning to the rst stage, it is
simple matter to verify that no foreign brands enter or exit provided that:
n+ 1 >
s
cL
FF + S(1 R) and
r
cL
FF
 n: (9)
To facilitate the analysis we assume below that the conditions in equation (9)
are satised, meaning that no entry or exit occurs when the exchange rate is
expected to remain indenitely at its PPP level of 1. Note that the latter
condition implies that:
L
c
 c
n
2
 FF  FD: (10)
In our 4-brand model, this assumption implies that the symmetric equilibrium
is sustainable if all players would initially expect the exchange rate to remain
at PPP forever14 and it will prove particularly useful below.
3.2 Tau-period PPP Deviation
Second, consider a fully anticipated PPP deviation that lasts for  periods, after
which the exchange rate reverts to its PPP value forever:
Etet+i = e1;t+i = e1;t; i = 1; 2; 3     (11)
Etet+i = e2;t++i = e2; ; i = 1; 2    : (12)
Small shocks are likely to leave the structure of the market unchanged while
large anticipated shocks may trigger entry or exit in the rst stage of the game.
This translates into a band of inaction, where neither new entry nor exit of
foreign rms takes place. Whenever exchange rate shocks fall within this range,
the market structure is una¤ected by the exchange rate shocks.
The rst subsection deals at length with the properties of the band of inac-
tion and the e¤ects of shocks within this particular range. The next subsection
describes what happens when currency shocks exceed these bounds. In this sec-
tion we simply assume the home country is relatively small with respect to the
rest of the world, which means that uctuations of the domestic currency have
no e¤ect on the prices of similar goods marketed abroad. This is equivalent
to assuming that domestic rms are not active in foreign markets. Given this
14Strictly speaking, this assumption conicts with the perfect foresight assumption in the
next subsection.
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assumption, the real exchange rate behavior is governed by domestic prices and
the nominal exchange rate.15 In Section 4, however, this assumption is dropped.
3.2.1 Asymmetry of Band of Inaction under Small Exchange Rate
Shocks
For any value  an upper and lower bound can be derived on the size of currency
shocks. Whenever currency shocks exceed these bounds, the structure of the
market is altered. Let e denote the size of the  period PPP deviation
(e = 1   e). To keep the analysis tractable, we introduce some additional
notation. Let
x(n) =
 
c
n
  1
(1 R )
r
(1 R )

c
L (F
F ) R   cn2
!
(13)
and
x(n) =
 
c
n+ 1
  1
(1 R )
s
(1 R )

c
L (F
F + (1 R)S) R

c
n+1
2!
;
(14)
where n is any non-negative integer. The conditions in equation (10) imply that
x(n)  0 and x(n)  0: Also note that jx(n+ 1)j  jx(n)j and x(n)  x(n+ 1):
Proposition 1.a: When the size of the  period currency shock falls in the
interval
 
e4 ;e
4


; there is a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(henceforth SPNE) of the two-stage game without entry and/or exit in
the rst stage. e4 and e
4
 denote the largest PPP deviations persisting
for  periods without a¤ecting market structure:
e4 =
6
w
x(4);
e4 =
19
w
x(4): (15)
under suitable conditions16 .
Proof: See Appendix.
If the size of the shocks remains within the band of inaction, the two-stage
game has a unique SPNE: in the rst stage there is neither entry nor exit while
15For our purposes, the real exchange rate is dened as the average price of the goods sold
abroad in domestic currency relative to the average price of goods sold at home.
16 If

c
L
 
FF
 R   c
n
2
< 0 then the adjacent brand never leaves when fac-
ing a shock of duration  as a result of the small xed costs: Conversely, if
c
L
 
FF + (1 R)S R  c
n+1
2
< 0; no appreciation is needed to induce entry.
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in the second stage the 4 incumbent brands simply apply the pricing strategies
in equations (5), (6) and (7).
The foreign adjacent incumbent in the 4-brand market determines the upper
bound as this brand is most likely to leave after a depreciation. e4 is positive,
or e4 > 1, whenever rms realize positive prots with the exchange rate at
PPP17 . In this case the foreign rms are willing to accept temporary losses as
a result of the depreciation in anticipation of o¤setting future prots. If the
exchange rate depreciates beyond the e4 threshold, the initial 4-brand market
structure can no longer be sustained in equilibrium. The lower bound of the
range is determined by the potential entrantsstrategy. It can be veried that
e4 is negative, e
4
 < 1; provided that the no-entry condition in the benchmark
symmetric case is satised18 . Assume all of these conditions hold.
The band of inaction is not symmetrical around zero. Three aspects of the
model account for this asymmetry. Firstly, potential entrants naturally consider
the expected entry prots in a 5-brand market. All things being equal, average
prots are lower in a 5-brand market than in a 4-brand market. This tends to
increase the size of the appreciation needed to induce entry relative to the size
of the depreciation that triggers exit. Secondly, the entrant needs to incur a
sunk cost upon entry, which pushes the lower bound down. This sunk cost by
its very nature does not directly a¤ect the incumbentsstrategy. Consequently,
the upper bound does not directly depend on the size of the sunk cost. Finally,
the entering brand is by assumption located at the position furthest from the
domestic brand, its prots being less sensitive to the exchange rate as a result.
19 On the other hand, the incumbent which considers leaving is located next to
the domestic brand making its payo¤ highly sensitive to the exchange rate
Obviously, the assumption on the entry location stretches the band of inac-
tion asymmetry result, however this is not a key element to establish the band
of inaction asymmetry. Other aspects are su¢ cient for the result.
Next, we discuss the e¤ects of variations in the persistence of shocks, the
level of di¤erentiation and the cost structure on the size of the band of inaction.
Corollary 1.1: Firstly,e4 #;e4 " and the band of inaction
 
e4 ;e
4


shrinks
as persistence  increases. Secondly, e4 ";e4 # and the band of inac-
tion
 
e4 ;e
4


widens as the level of product di¤erentiation c increases.
Thirdly, e4 #;e4 # as xed costs F increase.
Proof: See Appendix.
The band of inaction shrinks as the persistence of shocks increases. An
increase in persistence () unambiguously lowers e4 and decreases e
4
 in
17This is whenever
 
c
4
2  FF c
L
: To see this, note that L
c
 
c
4
2  FF denotes the foreign
brandsprots in the symmetric equilibrium.
18See the second condition in eq (9) or equivalently
 
c
5
2
< c
L
FF + (1 R)S:
19Prescott and Visscher (1977) provide examples of endogenous entry within models where
rms enter sequentially and then determine simultaneously the equilibrium location and the
equilibrium number of rms. For tractability reasons we impose the new entrant to locate
furthest away from the domestic competitor making it least a¤ected by exchange rate shocks
at the same time least protable in terms of product positioning.
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absolute value under the assumptions in equation (10)(see the Appendix for a
proof). Smaller appreciations induce entry as persistence increases while smaller
depreciations su¢ ce to cause one of the foreign brands to leave. The e¤ects of
changes in the extent of product di¤erentiation ( cL ) are perhaps less obvious.
The upper bound tends to increase as the level of product di¤erentiation
rises. Di¤erentiation e¤ectively protects the foreign brand from erce price
competition at high exchange rates thereby reducing the size of its losses. Con-
versely, the lower bound drops because entry is not as protable at low exchange
rates20 . As it turns out, increases in the size of xed costs tend to widen and
shift the band of inaction.
The direct e¤ect of an increase in F is to lower e4 and increase e
4
 (in ab-
solute value), as can easily be veried. The band of inaction shifts downwards.
However, as xed costs increase, the original number of incumbents most likely
cannot not be sustained in the initial equilibrium at PPP as the conditions
in equation (10) would be violated. To account for this e¤ect, we explore the
change in the bounds while keeping equilibrium PPP prots 21 constant by
increasing c accordingly (while L remains xed). This comparative statics ex-
ercise will allow us to compare di¤erent industries with an identical number of
incumbents which feature di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation and dif-
ferent levels of brand maintenance and distribution costs. The net e¤ect of an
increase in F , combined with an o¤setting increase in c, clearly is to decrease
the lower bound of the band of inaction.
Corollary 1.2: Keeping the initial number of incumbents xed, the lower bound
of the band of inaction e4 # drops as F and c rise such that d = 0: The
e¤ect on the upper bound e4 cannot be signed in general.
Proof:
@e4
@F
dF +
@e4
@c
dc =

@e4
@F
L
16
+
@e4
@c

dc < 0; (16)
where d =  dF + L16dc = 0, as can be veried from Corollary 1.1 and
1.2.
The sign of the e¤ect on the upper bound cannot be determined unambigu-
ously. This suggests that the market structure in industries characterized by
both high levels of xed costs and high levels of product di¤erentiation is less
susceptible to appreciations than in other industries. Finally, the e¤ect of the
sunk cost itself merits some attention. Naturally, the direct e¤ect of an increase
in the size of sunk costs is to increase the required appreciation of the domestic
currency needed to induce entry. S does not a¤ect the upper bound directly.
However, an increase in S is likely to a¤ect the number of initial entrants which
20e4 drops or e
4
 increases in absolute value will be used interchangeably below.
Recall that we have assumed e4 < 0.
21 = L
c
 
c
4
2   FF
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we have assumed to x at 4 rms.22 To eliminate this e¤ect, we keep net ex-
pected prots23 n at PPP constant and explore the e¤ect of a change in the
industrys sunk to xed cost ratio. This represents the long-run e¤ect.
Corollary 1.3: Keeping the initial number of incumbents xed, the upper bound
of the band of inaction e4 " rises as the ratio of sunk to xed costs
increases. The lower bound e4 is not a¤ected.
Proof:
@e4
@S
jdn=0=   1
1 R
@e4
@F
> 0; (17)
@e4
@F
jdn=0= 0: (18)
As is to be expected, the market structure of industries characterized by a
high ratio of sunk to xed costs is less likely to be a¤ected by a depreciation.
Once the incumbents have incurred the sunk cost, they are willing to stay in the
market even at very low exchange rates. The ratio of sunk to xed costs has no
e¤ect on the minimum size of the appreciation that induces entry. Summarizing,
industries featuring higher sunk entry costs have comparatively wider positive
sections of the inaction band.
To drive this point home completely, consider the US experience of the 80s
in a high sunk entry cost industry. Suppose the initial appreciation of the
dollar exceeded the lower bound e4 , causing exactly one foreign brand to
make the required advertising expenditures and join the US market. If the
5 brand equilibrium is viable at PPP, all of the brands remain in the market
even after the exchange rate returns to its original value. In fact, a larger or
more persistent depreciation than the original appreciation is needed to revert
to the initial n-brand equilibrium when the ratio of sunk to xed costs is high,
as
e4   e5 for large SFF .
Corollary 1.4: e5 
e4  for S relatively large to F .
Proof: see Appendix.
Naturally, if the entrant anticipates losses once the exchange rate has re-
turned to its initial value at time t+  , he withdraws from the market at that
point in time rather than incur losses. A di¤erent lower bound then obtains.
Proposition 1.b: When the entrant anticipates losses at t+  , the lower bound
changes to:
22Violation of this assumption requires the calculation of initial entrants every time which
would diverge our focus from our main objective of entry and exit decisions.
23n(1 R) = L
c
 
c
4
2   FF   S(1 R)
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e4 =
19
w
 
c
5
 
s
c
L

FF +
(1 R)
1 R S
!
; (19)
for
 
c
5
2
< cLF
F :
Prices and Import Volumes Having described the nature of the band of
inaction, the behavior of prices and volumes in response to currency shocks
remains to be discussed. As long as the exchange rate change does not exceed
these bounds, rms simply follow the optimal pricing strategies in (5), (6) and
(7) while market structure remains unaltered. Using these strategies, simple
calculus yields the elasticities of prices and import volumes with respect to
exchange rate changes and we derive the following corollaries.
Corollary 1.5: The price adjustment in the domestic market is incomplete
with respect to the exchange rate shock when e 2
 
e4 ;e
4


: The
elasticity of prices with respect to changes in the exchange rates are:'D =
5
12 ;'
FA = 1012 , '
FNA = 1112 and '
Av = 912 where  =
1
1+ c4w
: The
market share of imports drops below its initial value of 3 quarters in case
of a depreciation when e 2
 
e4 ;e
4


: The elasticity of the volume of
imports w.r.t. the exchange rate in this setup is   59 wc :
Proof: For the rst part return to equations (5), (6) and (7). For the
second part see the Appendix.
The relative price of both imported brands (FA and FNA) increases in
response to a depreciation. The non-adjacent imported brand raises its price
by more than the adjacent imported brand, because it does not face direct
competition from the domestic brand. It should be noted that the relative
price of brand FA in terms of the domestic brand has an elasticity of 512 ,
whereas the brand FNA has an elasticity of 12 :
24 Unlike previous models, this
particular model predicts substantial di¤erences in pass-through depending on
the market position of the foreign and domestic brands. Clearly, pass-through
increases uniformly as the distance separating the foreign from the domestic
brand increases. The average price-elasticity (in other words weighted by market
share: 'Av = 912 ) is a useful indicator of overall pass-through in a given
industry.
Next, we evaluate the trade volumes. Note that the elasticity of imports
declines as the disutility cost per unit of distance increases, or equivalently, as
the substitutability of brands decreases. It increases as marginal costs increase,
since the exchange rate shocks a¤ect marginal costs. Since the underlying struc-
ture of the economy is not a¤ected by small currency shocks, no hysteresis e¤ects
obtain. When PPP is restored in period t +  (et+s = 1), all e¤ects of these
24These price elasticities decline as the substitutability of brands decreases (c ").
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small devaluations gradually disappear. Hence, we can refer to
 
e4 ;e
4


as
the band of inaction: in this range all exchange rate shocks are market structure
neutral and do not a¤ect prices and trade volumes in the long run.
3.2.2 Large Depreciations
Shocks outside of the range trigger structural changes. Note that the no-entry
condition in the symmetric equilibrium (see the second condition in equation (9)
) implies that appreciations cannot have any permanent e¤ects when S tends to
zero. For S = 0; the entrant simply leaves at t +  as the 5-brand equilibrium
is not sustainable at PPP: In case of a depreciation, re-entry at  + t will be
e¤ectively deterred only if the sunk entry cost is relatively large. By contrast, if
foreign entry is protable at PPP25 , the market reverts to its original 4-brand
equilibrium. If not, the 3-brand equilibrium prevails and the e¤ects of the
depreciation become permanent. For S = 0, entry is always protable (see the
second condition in equation (9) ) and naturally no hysteresis e¤ects obtain.
Remark 1: Large nominal currency shocks have hysteresis e¤ects only if the
sunk entry cost is non-zero.
First, we analyze the e¤ects of large depreciations. These cause one or several
of the foreign brands to quit serving the domestic market. Recall that entry
by an additional domestic rm is ruled out by the restriction imposed on the
number of potential domestic producers. The domestic incumbent always stays
irrespective of the foreign brandsstrategies: re-entry is a dominant strategy for
this rm, as it anticipates strictly positive prots in every future period. The
following propositions describe a number of SPNE in which one or more of the
foreign incumbents quit in the rst stage of the game.
If the size of the depreciation does not exceed a given threshold, the non-
adjacent foreign brand stays regardless of the other brandsstrategies. In this
case the theory allows for accurate predictions about which brand(s) will actu-
ally leave. If the size of the depreciation exceeds this bound, multiple equilibria
obtain. In some of these the non-adjacent brands leave.
Proposition 2.a:When the size of the  period currency depreciation falls in
the interval
 
e4 ;e
4;NA


; at least one of the adjacent foreign brands
leaves the market in the rst stage in both of the SPNE of the two-stage
game.
e4;NA =
12
w
x(4); (20)
for F
F c
L  R
 
c
4
2
and
 
c
4
2  FF cL :
25 L
c
 
c
4
2   F   S(1 R)  0
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Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 2.b:When the size of the  period depreciation shock falls in the
interval
 
e4 ;e
3


ande3  e4;NA ; exactly one of the adjacent foreign
brands leaves the market in the rst stage in both of the SPNE of the two-
stage game.
e3 =
5
w
x(3); (21)
for F
F c
L  R
 
c
3
2
and
 
c
3
2  FF cL :
Proposition 2.c:When the size of the  period currency depreciation falls in
the interval
 
e4;NA ;e
3


and e3 > e
4;NA
 ; exactly one of the foreign
brands, but not necessarily the adjacent one, leaves the market in the rst
stage in both of the SPNE of the two-stage game.
Proof: see Appendix.
Prices and Import Volumes This decrease in the number of foreign brands
has two distinct e¤ects on prices. Firstly, all brands are subject to a once-o¤
and uniform price increase, the size of which does not vary with the size of the
exchange rate change. The increased extent of product di¤erentiation due to
the decrease in the total number of brands only a¤ects absolute price levels: all
brands charge a uniformly higher price as a result of the decrease in the total
number of brands. Consumers therefore end up with a lower surplus. Secondly,
and more importantly, the relative number of foreign brands will have decreased.
As a result, foreign rms will face tougher price competition from the domestic
brand when the real exchange rate falls below PPP. As a consequence they are
prevented from raising their prices by as much when the exchange rate rises26 .
The price elasticities are smaller than the ones in the small devaluation case.
The percentage increase in domestic and imported brands absolute prices may
be either larger or smaller than in the 4-brand case, depending on the relative
size of these two e¤ects.
26 In a 3-brand market the optimal pricing strategies for domestic and foreign brands are:
pD =
c
3
+
1
5
(3wD + 2ewF ); (22)
and
pF =
c
3
+
1
5
(wD + 4ewF ): (23)
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Corollary 2.1: When e 2
 
e4 ;e
3


, all prices are subject to a uniform
price increase (of 1/3). In addition, rms price to the market and the
elasticity of prices with respect to changes in the exchange rates are:'D =
2
5
e ;'F = 45 e and 'Av = 23 e where e = 11+ c3w . On the other hand, large
exchange rate devaluations have proportionately larger e¤ects on imports
than small devaluations. When e 2
 
e4 ;e
3


; the elasticity of the
volume of imports with respect to the exchange rate is   35 wc :
Proof: From equations (22) and (23).
The percentage increase in the relative price of imported goods is unambiguously
lower in the large devaluation case: 25 : The relative price elasticity is entirely
determined by the second e¤ect. Large devaluations trigger smaller relative im-
port price increases. The average price elasticity drops from 34
1
1+ c4w
to 23
1
1+ c3w
;
clearly indicating an overall decrease in pass-through due to the decrease in
foreign brand market power.
Next, we turn to trade volumes. Two mutually strengthening e¤ects deter-
mine the response of import volumes to the exchange rate change. Firstly, there
exists a one-o¤ market structure e¤ect: the drop in the number of foreign rms
causes the market share of imports to drop by a given percentage whenever the
currency devaluation exceeds the upper bound (e4 ):
27 Secondly, there is the
direct e¤ect of the real exchange rate change on import volumes. The latter
turns out to be larger than the percentage change in response to small exchange
rate changes (this can be veried by returning to Corollary 1.2). This means
that the percentage decline in imports is unambiguously larger in response to
large exchange rate changes.
Note that large devaluations have a stronger impact on imports than small
devaluations because the resulting decrease in the relative number of foreign
rms toughens price competition with the domestic rm as the non-adjacent
foreign rm becomes an adjacent foreign rm.
Finally, we examine what happens when the exchange rate returns to its
original value. Recall that non-incumbents incur a sunk cost S. Re-entry will
only be deterred when this sunk cost is relatively large.
Corollary 2.2: When e 2
 
e4 ;e
3


the 3-brand market structure is pre-
served at time t+  when PPP is restored in all of the SPNE of the game
if and only if
4 >
s
cL
FF + S(1 R) (24)
Proof: Consider the expected prots at PPP to derive this condition.
27 In our numerical example the lump-sized percentage increase in the volume of imports
equals 6%.
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Large temporary exchange rate changes can have lasting e¤ects on prices and
trade volumes if entrants incur a su¢ ciently large sunk cost. If so, all brands
charge a uniformly higher price (p = c3 + w) from t +  and imports only
account for 66% of total sales in the domestic market, as opposed to 75% before
the depreciation.
3.2.3 Large Appreciations
Large appreciations cause one or several of the non-incumbent foreign brands
to enter the market. In addition, the domestic incumbent may consider leaving
its home market if it anticipates high losses as a result of the appreciation.
Proposition 3.a: The home brand invariably leaves the market in the rst stage
of the two stage game if the appreciation exceeds e4;D :
e4;D =  
12
5w
xD(4); (25)
for F
Dc
L  R
 
c
4
2
;
 
c
4
2  FDcL and xD(4) = x(4) where F is adjusted
accordingly:
Proof: see derivation of Proposition 2.a.
Naturally, if the domestic brand leaves, pass-through is complete since the
remaining n foreign brands price according to:
pF = ew +
c
n
(26)
This type of markets imply full import dependence, such as in the case of oil
markets. Our suggestion is very much in line with the ndings of Campa and
Goldberg (2005) where they document complete exchange rate pass through in
oil import prices in most of the OECD economies. Note also that the domes-
tic brand never leaves, regardless of the size of the appreciation provided that
FDc
L  R
 
c
4
2
: In order to concentrate on foreign entry and exit, it simply
needs to be assumed that this condition holds for all shocks e considered in
this last section28 .
Proposition 3.b: When the size of the  period currency appreciation falls in
the interval
 
e5 ;e
4


; one foreign brand enters the market in the rst
stage of the SPNE of the two-stage game.
e5 =
45
w
x(5) (27)
28 In other words, we assume FD is su¢ ciently small.
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Proof: for
 
c
6
2  cL  FF  and cL  FF + (1 R)S  R   c6 :
If the 5-brand conguration is not sustainable at PPP29 , the entering rms
optimal strategy is to leave at t+  : Hence, a new bound obtains:
e5 =
45
w
 
c
6
 
s
c
L

FF +
(1 R)
1 R S
!
: (28)
If the appreciation exceeds e5 , 2 foreign brands will enter. Recall that the
total number of potential foreign brands serving the domestic market was xed
at ve. No additional entry is feasible.
Proposition 3.c:When the size of the  period currency appreciation exceeds
e5 ; two foreign brands enter the market in the rst stage of the SPNE
of the two-stage game.
Prices and Import Volumes As before, this change in the number of foreign
brands has two distinct e¤ects on prices. Firstly, the total number of brands
has increased. The price mark-ups are subject to a once-o¤ and uniform cut,
independent of the size of the exchange rate appreciation. Secondly, the relative
number of domestic brands has decreased. As a result, foreign rms will not
face as much price competition from the domestic brand.
Corollary 3.1: When e 2
 
e5 ;e
4


; all prices are subject to a uniform
price decrease. In addition, rms price to the market and the elasticity of
prices w.r.t. changes in the exchange rates are:'D = 819
e ;'FA1 = 1619 e ;
'FNA = 1819
e and 'Av = 45 e ; where e = 11+ c5w : On the other hand, volume
of imports increases proportionally higher with large appreciations than
with small appreciations. When e 2
 
e4 ;e
3


; the elasticity of the
volume of imports w.r.t. the exchange rate is   1019 wc :
Proof: From equations (22) and (23).Firstly, the across-the-board price cut of
all prices amounts to 20%: Secondly, the average price elasticity increases
to 45
1
1+ c5w
; which reects the foreign brandsrelative increase in market
share power30 . As a result, pass-through is clearly larger in response to
large appreciations. This result continues to hold more generally. It does
not depend on our assumption about the cost structure of domestic and
foreign rms and the resulting tendency of the domestic incumbent not to
quit even at relatively low exchange rates. In fact, if the domestic brand
leaves in response to an appreciation, pass-through is complete.
29That is if
 
c
6
2  c
L
 
FF

:
30Note that the relative import price elasticies for the adjacent brands ( 8
19
for the FA
brand and 10
19
for the FNA brand)) are slightly higher than the corresponding relative price
elasticities in the case of small appreciations ( 5
12
for the FA brand and 6
12
for the FNA
brand).
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Next, we turn to trade volumes. Two mutually strengthening e¤ects deter-
mine the response of import volumes to the exchange rate change. Firstly, there
is a one-o¤ market structure e¤ect: the increase in the number of foreign rms
causes the market share of imports to rise by a given percentage whenever the
currency appreciation exceeds the lower bound (e4 ):
31 Secondly, there is the
direct e¤ect of the real exchange rate change on import volumes. Large ex-
change rate appreciations have proportionately smaller direct e¤ects (about a
30% drop) on imports than small ones, because the resulting increase in the
relative number of foreign rms makes prices more responsive to exchange rate
changes when the real exchange rate drops below PPP. The total percentage in-
crease in imports reects the combined impact of both of the above and cannot
be unambiguously determined.
Small and large appreciations have signicantly di¤erent e¤ects on prices in
this version of the model. Pass-through is larger in response to large apprecia-
tions. For given foreign prices, this implies that real exchange rate deviations
are larger in response to large negative shocks than in response to large positive
shocks. In contrast, the responses to small shocks are symmetrical.
Remark 2: Pass-through is smaller for e > e4 shocks than for e 2 
e4 ;e
4


: Pass-through is larger for e < e4 shocks than for e 2 
e4 ;e
4


:
The extent of pass-through increases even further as an additional foreign brand
enters. The average price elasticity increases to 56
1
1+ c6w
: In addition, the market
structure e¤ect of entry on the part of these two brands increases the volume of
imports by about 50%. On the other hand, the volume of imports becomes less
responsive to exchange rate changes as a result of the foreign brands increased
market share.
Corollary 3.2: When e  e5 ; all prices are subject to a uniform price
decrease. In addition, rms price to the market and the elasticity of prices
with respect to changes in the exchange rates are:'D = 1945
e ;'FA1 = 3845 e ;
'FA2 = 4345
e ;'FNA = 4445 e and 'Av = 56 e where e = 11+ c6w . On the
other hand, when e  e5 ; the elasticity of the volume of imports with
respect to the exchange rate is   3875 wc .
3.3 Autocorrelation
To illustrate the more general scope of the above results, we explore the impact
of a shock that dies out gradually. The model and all the assumptions intro-
duced in the previous section are maintained unless indicated otherwise. Most
importantly, all of the agents again are assumed to have perfect foresight. As
before, an upper and lower bound can be derived. Shocks within this band of
31 In our numerical example the lump-sized percentage decrease in the volume of imports
equals 12%.
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inaction do not a¤ect market structure. The size of this range depends on the
specics of the time series process.
Let us consider an AR(1)-process:
et =
1X
s=0
s"t+s: (29)
We can write the upper and lower bounds of inaction as:
x(n) =
 
c
n
 
r
FF c
L
1
1 2R  
 
c
n
2 R(1 )2
(1 R)(1 R)2
!
; (30)
and
x(n) =
 
c
n+ 1
 
s
(FF+(1 R)S)c
L
1
1 2R  

c
n+1
2
R(1 )2
(1 R)(1 R)2
!
; (31)
where n is any non-negative integer. Given this denition of x(n) and x(n),
all of the above results carry over to this adjusted version of the model. For the
sake of brevity, we only mention the 1st proposition again for a 4 rm set-up.
Proposition 4 When the size of the  period currency shock falls in the interval 
e4 ;e
4


; there is a unique SPNE of the two-stage game without entry
and/or exit in the rst stage, where e4 and e
4
 denote the largest PPP
deviations persisting for  periods without a¤ecting market structure:
e4 =
6
w
x(4);
e4 =
19
w
x(4); (32)
assuming the 5-brand-equilibrium is protable: Lc (
c
5 )
2   F  0.
Proof: Analogous to previous derivations.
3.4 Baldwin Hypothesis
The same exercise can be carried out for more general time series processes.
One could easily introduce a second-order autoregressive process
et = (1  1L  2L2) 1"t; (33)
to describe the hump-shaped time pattern - large rise and subsequent fall - of
the US dollar centered around 1985 and, as was done for the AR(1), derive the
bounds of the band of inaction. As it turns out, the general predictions of the
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model are entirely consistent with the US experience in the mid-80s.32 Consider
an initial shock e to the US dollar that falls below the appropriately dened
lower bound en; where n denotes the number of incumbents in the industry:
This triggers entry by one or several of the foreign brands. All domestic US
prices decrease by a given percentage (depending on the exact number of rms in
the industry) as a result of the decreased mark-up. In addition, the appreciation
has a larger direct impact on brand prices because of the increased elasticity
of US prices with respect to the dollar (see Corollary 3.2 and Remark 1). As
the dollar depreciates back to its original value (e = 1); some of the m foreign
entrants remain in the US market and US rms do not regain all of their lost
market shares. In fact, if the n +m-brand symmetric equilibrium is protable
L
c (
c
n+m )
2   F  0

; none of the entrants leave. As the number of rms does
not change, the depreciation has no mark-up e¤ect on US prices. There is
only a direct exchange rate e¤ect. Even if a number of the m entrants leave
after the exchange rate has returned to its original value, the mark-up e¤ect
would still be smaller than the e¤ect of the appreciation, unless all m left. In
addition, as foreign brands leave, average pass-through declines and the direct
e¤ect decreases . Hence, the model predicts US prices do not rise by as much
during the depreciation as they fell during the appreciation, which is exactly
what happened (see Baldwin, 1988).
4 Home and Abroad
So far, in analyzing pass-through, we have maintained the small country as-
sumption which holds that domestic currency shocks were not allowed to a¤ect
the foreign prices of the same commodity. This section puts it all together. The
foreign market is introduced into the analysis and examines the combined e¤ect
of pricing responses at home and abroad on the real exchange rate. Coming back
to the US experience of the 80s, the dollar rise and subsequent fall is likely to
have a¤ected European and Japanese prices as well in most industries, given the
strong presence of US enterprises abroad. Second, the exact numerical results
in the previous sections naturally depend on the relative number of domestic
vis-à-vis foreign incumbents and the absolute number of brands in the market.33
This sections numerical examples serve to illustrate the more general scope of
the above results.
Firstly, the basic results discussed above are shown to reproduce themselves
in slightly di¤erent market settings. Table 1 summarizes the e¤ects of variations
in the relative number of foreign versus domestic market players. All of the
basic assumptions of the model above continue to hold. Recall that domestic
and foreign brands are clustered.
32Note that during the 1980s the European trade balance was more responsive to exchange
rate uctuations as compared to the United States or Japan. For some European, in particular
German, evidence consult Gagnon and Knetter (1995), Feenstra et al. (1996) or Feenstra and
Kendall (1997).
33Also see Dornbusch (1987).
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Also, consider the price and import elasticities reported in Table 1 and notice
how the price elasticities decline as the relative number of domestic market
players increases, while the import volume elasticities increase. The elasticity
of import prices tends to unity as the number of foreign rms increases relative
to the number of domestic rms.34 Logically, higher levels of pass-through
prevail in foreign dominated markets. In fact, it is obvious from Table 1 and 2
that the average price elasticity simply equals the proportion of foreign brands
operating in the market (times a constant which increases uniformly with the
absolute number of brands).35
Remark 3: The average elasticity of prices with respect to exchange rates equals
the market share of foreign brands times a constant  ; where  = 11+ cnw
.
The closest neighboring foreign brands of the domestic brand invariably have
lower absolute and relative import price elasticities. As domestic brand concen-
tration increases, import volumes become more responsive to devaluations, while
the price-cost margins of foreign brands are subject to a larger drop for a given
size of the devaluation. As a result of this, foreign brands leave the market at
increasingly lower levels of the exchange rate: the upper bound decreases and
the band of inaction shrinks. Note from Table 1 that the range in the 3D-1F
setup is about one third of the 1D-3F range. A similar decrease obtains in the 6
brand case. Conversely, the lower bound rises (i.e. decreases in absolute value)
as domestic concentration increases. This allows the entering foreign brand to
realize larger prots in case of an appreciation as the home brandsprices re-
spond very little to the appreciation. Summarizing, as domestic concentration
rises, the band of inaction shrinks and ultimately disappears altogether.
It is easy to verify that the basic results derived in Propositions 1,2 and
3 and the Corollaries continue to hold as the relative number of foreign and
domestic brands changes.
Remark 4: The band of inaction shrinks uniformly as domestic concentration
increases. It all but disappears as the domestic brandsmarket share tends
to unity.
Next, we drop the small country assumption. First, consider small shocks,
i.e. those that fall within the band of inaction. Consider a world consisting of
two countries, home and foreign. From Table 1 and 2, it is easy to verify that
the real exchange rate is not a¤ected by small nominal shocks if domestic rms
and foreign rms have identical market shares at home and abroad. If domestic
34However, relative import price elasticities (import prices in terms of domestically manu-
factured commodities) are nearly invariant to changes in the relative number of domestic vs.
foreign brands. Let x denote the initial number of domestic brands, while y is the number
of foreign brands. Switching from a xD-yF to a yD-xF market does not change the relative
import price elasticities, as can readily observed in Tables 1 and 2. .
35This result turns out not to depend on the clustering of domestic and foreign brands. In
fact, Dornbuschs (1987) alternating/symmetric setup yields an average price elasticity of 1=2
 , which is exactly the market share of foreign rms.
24
rms have a higher market share at home than abroad, then pass-through is
less than complete and the real exchange rate tracks the nominal exchange
rate, albeit less than one-for-one. Finally, pass-through exceeds 100% whenever
domestic rms jointly have a higher market share abroad than at home. Given
that intra-industry trade accounts for an increasing portion of the total trade
volume, this qualication of our previous result is quite important.
Consider for instance the case where 1 domestic and 3 foreign brands com-
pete both at home and abroad. In response to a small1% depreciation, the
average domestic price increases by .75% and the average foreign price decreases
by .25%, leaving the real exchange rate unchanged. By contrast, if the domestic
rm is not active abroad, the real exchange depreciates by .25% in response to
a 1% nominal depreciation. Finally, in the unlikely case that 2 domestic rms
operate abroad (in a 4-brand market), the real exchange rate appreciates by .25
%.
Remark 5: The real exchange rate is invariant with respect to small nominal
shocks if the market structures at home and abroad are fully symmetrical.
If the domestic brands have a smaller market share abroad than at home,
pass-through is incomplete. The real exchange rate variability increases as
the di¤erence between the domestic and foreign market shares increases. If
the domestic brands have a larger market share abroad than at home, the
real exchange rate moves in the direction counter to the nominal exchange
rate.
To conclude, we briey consider what this implies for relinquishing the na-
tional currencies as in the case of EMU. If the volume of intra-industry trade
within Europe grows and market structures in di¤erent European countries
slowly become more alike as a result of the economic integration process, nomi-
nal currency shocks are less likely to have signicant e¤ects on the real exchange
rate. This means that (ex-post) the cost of giving up the national currencies as
a tool to improve competitiveness will be very small. In fact, in the limiting case
in which the market structures in di¤erent European countries are completely
identical, both the real exchange rate and the current account are invariant
with respect to nominal shocks. This would clearly reduce the importance of
the exchange rate as a tool of macroeconomic policy. On the other hand, if
the process of economic integration favors regional concentration, the opposite
result obtains and the loss of monetary autonomy may (ex-post) be quite costly.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper focused on the short and long term aspects of nominal exchange rate
shocks. We analyzed the e¤ects of nominal currency shocks on prices and market
structure in di¤erentiated goods markets served by domestic and foreign brands.
Nominal shocks that fall within a given range do not a¤ect market structure and
have no hysteresis e¤ects. The bounds of this range are asymmetric. The size
25
Table 1: Four Brands: Domestic and Foreign Brands Clustered
Setup Upper Bound Lower Bound Price Elasticity Average Price El. Import El.
n = 4 e4 e
4

1D&3F 6wx(n)
19
w x(n)
'D = 512 
'FA = 1012 
'FNA = 1112 
3
4   5w9c
2D&2F 4wx(n)
19
2wx(n)
'D = 312 
'F = 912 
2
4  wc
3D&1F 125wx(n)
19
5wx(n)
'DNA = 112 
'DA = 212 
'F = 712 
1
4   5w3c
Table 2: Six Brands: Domestic and Foreign Brands Clustered
Setup Price Elasticity Average Price El. Import Elasticity
n = 6
1D&5F
'D1 = 1945 
'FA1 = 3845 
'FA2 = 4345 
'FNA = 4445 
5
6   38w75c
2D & 4F
'DA = 415 
'FA1 = 1215 
'FA2 = 1415 
4
6   4w5c
3D & 3F
'DNA = 19 
'DA = 29 
'FA = 79 
'FNA = 89 
3
6   10w9c
4D & 2F
'DA1 = 115 
'DA2 = 315 
'FA = 1115 
2
6   8w5c
5D & 1F
'F = 2645 
'DA1 = 745 
'DA2 = 245 
'DNA = 145 
1
6   38w15c
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of the asymmetry depend on the size and persistence of the nominal exchange
rate shock, the nature of product heterogeneity and the relative size of the
sunk entry cost. More heterogeneity favors the brands that are at a competitive
disadvantage. As a result, it discourages entry of foreign brands at low exchange
rates. Similarly, it makes foreign brands less likely to leave at high exchange
rates. This implies that the band of inaction widens as the level of product
di¤erentiation increases. On the other hand, sunk costs invariably protect the
incumbents. If sunk costs are relatively large, foreign incumbents may stay in the
market even at low exchange rates. As the ratio of sunk- to xed costs increases,
the upper bound of the band of inaction rises. High sunk cost industries are less
susceptible to large depreciations. Finally, this range shrinks as the domestic
brandsmarket share rises.
Outside of this range, shocks trigger entry or exit. In this case the industrys
pricing and pass-through parameters are permanently altered. Pass-through
turns out to grow larger when appreciations fall below the lower bound. It de-
creases when depreciations exceed the upper bound. Taking foreign prices as
given, this asymmetrical response implies large and persistent positive than neg-
ative real exchange rate deviations. On the other hand we argue that hysteresis
result can obtain if and only if sunk costs are non-zero.
When accounting for the change in foreign prices, strategic pricing behav-
ior as such is not always su¢ cient to generate real exchange rate uctuations.
In fact, if foreign and domestic brands have identical market shares in both
markets, pass-through is complete and the real exchange rate is invariant with
respect to small nominal shocks. More generally, pricing-to-market yields sub-
stantial variability of the industry real exchange rate if and only if the domestic
brands foreign market shares fall considerably short of its domestic market
shares. This suggests that in industries characterized by substantial inter-
industry trade, pricing-to-market alone may not su¢ ce as an explanation of
observed real exchange rate behavior.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, the upper bound on the exchange rate is derived
from the objective function of the adjacent foreign brand in equation (3) by
inserting the values of all future exchange rates. The foreign adjacent rm opts
to leave the market if its expected payo¤ is negative, i.e. if:
vFA(e) =
t 1X
s=0
Rs
 
L
c

2
12
w(1  et+1+s) + c
4
2
  FF
!
+
1X
s=t
Rs

L
c
 c
4
2
  FF

: (34)
This is equivalent to:
vFA(e) =
1 R
1 R
 
L
c

2
12
w(1  e) + c
4
2
  FF
!
+

L
c
 c
4
2
  FF

R
1 R  0: (35)
Solving this equation for the root of e on the positive section of the demand
curve yields:
e4 = 1 +
6
w
 
c
4
  1
1 R
s
(1 R )

FF c
L
 R
 c
4
2!
; (36)
for

FF c
L  R
 
c
4
2  0: If FF cL  R   c42 < 0 the foreign brand never
quits irrespective of the actual size of the depreciation. On the other hand, if
FF c
L  R
 
c
4
2
< 0; the foreign brand does not quit when facing a  period
PPP deviation regardless of its actual size. The existence of a real root re-
quires

FF c
L  R
 
c
4
2  0 ;  cL  FF + (1 R)S R   c52  0 and   c52 
c
L
 
FF + (1 R)S(see equation 10): Assume these conditions are satised.
Second, in case of an appreciation (e < 1) an additional foreign rm decides
to enter if its expected payo¤, derived by plugging the future exchange rates in
equation (4), covers the sunk entry cost. Assuming that the entrant remains in
the market after t+  (
 
c
5
2  cL  FF ) ; its entry payo¤ becomes:
vFNA(e) =
1 R
1 R
 
L
c

1
19
w(1  e) + c
5
2
  FF
!
+

L
c
 c
5
2
  FF

R
1 R   S  0: (37)
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Again, solving for the root of e on the positive section of the demand curve one
obtains the lower bound for the exchange rate:
e4 = 1 +
19
w
 
c
5
  1
1 R
s
(1 R )

c
L
(FF + (1 R)S) R
 c
5
2!
;
(38)
for

c
L
 
FF + (1 R)S R   c52  0: If the latter condition is violated, no
 -period appreciation, regardless of its size, triggers entry.
Suppose to the contrary that the entrant is located at one of the adjacent
positions. It is easy to verify from the objective function in equation (3) that
this gives rise to a new lower bound:
e4 = 1 +
19
3w
 
c
5
  1
1 R
s
(1 R )
 c
L
 
FF + (1 R)S
 R   c52
!
: (39)
If the entrant anticipates losses once the exchange rate has returned to its
initial value at time t +  (i.e. if
 
c
5
2
< cLF
F ), he leaves the market at that
point in time rather than incur losses. In this case the correct lower bound can
be derived by nding the root of the non-negativity condition on the expected
entry payo¤:
vFNA(e) =
1 R
1 R
 
L
c

1
19
w(1  e) + c
5
2
  FF
!
  S  0; (40)
Proof of Corollary 1.1:
Consider the e¤ects of an increase in  . Taking partial derivatives yields:
@e4
@
=   6
w
R lnR
0@r(1 R )FF cL  R( c4 )2
(1 R )2  
R lnR

R( c4 )
2 FF cL

2
r
(1 R )

FF c
L  R( c4 )
2

1A
=
6
w
R lnR

( c4 )
2 FF cL

2(1 R )2
r
(1 R )

FF c
L  R( c4 )
2
 ; (41)
which is negative if the conditions in equation (10) hold and if R < 1. Consider
the e¤ects of an increase in  on the lower bound. Taking partial derivatives
yields:
@e4
@
=  19
w
R lnR
0@r(1 R )FF cL  R( c5 )2
(1 R )2  
R lnR

R( c5 )
2 FF cL

2
r
(1 R )

FF c
L  R( c5 )
2

1A ;
=
19
w
R lnR
 
( c5 )
2  (F
F+S(1 R))c
L
!
2(1 R )2
r
(1 R )

FF c
L  R( c5 )
2
 : (42)
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which is positive if the conditions in equation (10) hold and if R < 1.
Next, apply the envelope theorem to derive the e¤ect of an increase in c on
the adjacent brands prots:
@vFA(e)
@c
=
1 R
1 R  
L
c2

2
12
w(1  e)
 
pFA   we > 0 for e < 1: (43)
As before, apply the envelope theorem to derive the e¤ect of an increase in c on
the non-adjacent brands expected payo¤:
@vFNA(e)
@c
=
1 R
1 R  
L
c2

1
19
w(1  e)
 
pFNA   we < 0 for e > 1: (44)
To see the e¤ect of an increase in F verify only that the terms within the square
root of equations (13) and (14) are non-negative.
Proof of Corollary 1.4: By comparing e5 and e
4
 derive the condition on
S :
S(1 R)
F
=
4
9
L
c
 c
5
2
(1 R ) + 8
9
  L
9F
s
(1 R )
 c
L
 
FF

 R   c52

(45)
Proof of Corollary 1.5: Note that the total volume of imports is:
L
c

3c
4
+
5
12
(1  e)w

: (46)
Calculate the elasticity for e = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.a: Use the objective function of the non-adjacent
brand in equation (3) to derive this brands expected payo¤.
vFNA(e) =
1 R
1 R
 
L
c

1
12
w(1  e) + c
4
2
  FF
!
+

L
c
 c
4
2
  FF

R
1 R:
(47)
If this is strictly positive, the non-adjacent brands dominant strategy obviously
consists in staying. This can be solved to obtain:
e4;NA =
12
w
 
c
4
  11 R
r
(1 R )

FF c
L  R
 
c
4
2!
; (48)
Given that the non-adjacent brand stays in the rst stage, at least one of
the adjacent foreign brands leaves in the rst stage of both of the pure strategy
SPNE.
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Proof of Proposition 2.b: In the 3-brand market the foreign brands expected
payo¤ is:
vF (e) =
1 R
1 R
 
L
c

1
5
w(1  e) + c
3
2
  FF
!
+

L
c
 c
3
2
  FF

R
1 R:
(49)
Solve for the root of this equation to obtain:
e3 =
5
w
 
c
3
  11 R
r
(1 R )

FF c
L  R
 
c
3
2!
; (50)
If this payo¤ is strictly positive, one of the foreign adjacent brands stays given
that the other brand leaves.
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